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Abstract. This study proposes the concept of disruptive firms: they are firms with market 
leadership that deliberate introduce new and improved generations of durable goods that 
destroy, directly or indirectly, similar products present in markets in order to support their 
competitive advantage and/or market leadership. These disruptive firms support 
technological and industrial change and induce consumers to buy new products to adapt to 
new socioeconomic environment. In particular, disruptive firms generate and spread path-
breaking innovations in order to achieve and sustain the goal of a (temporary) profit 
monopoly. This organizational behaviour and strategy of disruptive firms support 
technological change. This study can be useful for bringing a new perspective to explain 
and generalize one of the determinants that generates technological and industrial change. 
Overall, then this study suggests that one of the general sources of technological change is 
due to disruptive firms (subjects), rather than disruptive technologies (objects), that 
generate market shifts in a Schumpeterian world of innovation-based competition.  
Keywords. Disruptive technologies, Disruptive firms, Radical innovations, R&D 
management, Competitive advantage, Industrial change. 
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1. Introduction 
urrent economies show the advent of many technological advances in 
information technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology, etc. that generate 
corporate, industrial and economic change (Arora et al., 2001; Henderson & 
Clark, 1990; Nicholson et al., 1990; Teece et al., 1997; Van de Ven at al., 2008; 
von Hippel, 1988). The literature in these research fields has suggested several 
approaches to explain the technological and industrial change, such as the theory 
by Christensen (1997, 2006) that introduces the concept of disruptive technologies 
of new entrants that disrupt the competitive advantage of incumbents in the 
presence market dynamisms. This theory explains the industrial change with the 
interplay between incumbent and entrant firms that can generate path-breaking 
Technologies (Ansari et al., 2016; King & Baatartogtokh, 2015; Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Christensen, 1997, 2006; Christensen et al., 2015; Danneels, 
2004, 2006; Gilbert & Bower, 2002; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Jenkins, 2010; King 
et al., 2015; Ryan & Tipu, 2013; Tellis, 2006; Wessel & Christensen, 2012). While 
the validity of certain of these studies may be debated, it is clear that there are at 
least some facts about industrial change that theory of disruptive technologies has 
trouble explaining. As a matter of fact, current dynamics of industries shows that 
new entrants can generate disruptive technologies but their development and 
diffusion between markets have more and more economic barriers (Coccia, 2016; 
2017).  
This paper suggests that industrial change is driven by specific subjects -
disruptive firms, rather than disruptive technologies per se. This study can be 
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useful for bringing a new perspective to explain and generalize one of the sources 
of technological change that is represented by specific firms that have the potential 
to generate and/or to develop radical innovations that disrupt current products in 
markets and support industrial, economic and social change. 
In order to position this study in existing approaches, the paper develops the 
theoretical framework in next section.   
 
2. Theoretical framework  
Many industries are characterized by incumbents that focus mainly on 
improving their products and services (usually most profitable), and entrants that 
endeavor to develop new technologies in market segments, delivering market 
performance that incumbents’ mainstream customers require (Christensen et al., 
2015; Christensen, 1997). In this context, Christensen (1997) argues that disruptive 
innovations generate significant shifts in markets (cf., Henderson, 2006). In 
particular, disruptive innovations are generated by small firms with fewer resources 
that successfully challenge established incumbent businesses (Christensen et al., 
2015). New firms can generate competence-destroying discontinuities that increase 
the environmental turbulence, whereas incumbents focus mainly on competence-
enhancing discontinuities that decrease the turbulence in markets (cf., Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986). Scholars also argue that the ability of incumbents to develop and 
to market disruptive innovations is due to their specific ambidexterity: competence-
destroying and competence-enhancing based on simultaneous exploratory and 
exploitative activities to support both incremental and radical innovations 
(Danneels, 2006; Durisin & Todorova, 2012; Lin & McDonough III, 2014; 
O’Reilly III & Tushman, 2004, 2008; cf., Henderson, 2006; Madsen & Leiblein, 
2015) 1 . Disruptive innovations generate main effects both for consumers and 
producers in markets and society (Markides, 2006, pp. 22-23; Markides & Geroski, 
2005). In general, disruptive innovations change habits of consumers in markets 
and undermine the competences and complementary assets of existing producers. 
Calvano (2007) argues that: ‚we highlight the role of destruction rather than 
creation in driving innovative activity. The formal analysis shows that destructive 
creation unambiguously leads to higher profits whatever the innovation cost‛. In 
particular, disruptive innovations disturb the business models of incumbents that 
have to counter mobilize resources to sustain their competitive advantage in the 
presence of market change (Garud et al., 2002; Markman & Waldron, 2014). In 
fact, new radical technologies in markets require that incumbents undertake 
specific R&D investments and strategic change to support competitive advantage 
(Christensen & Raynor, 2003; cf., Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Teece et al., 1997). 
Current R&D management of incumbents, to support innovation processes, is more 
and more based on network organizations to build research alliances and strategic 
partnerships for increasing the access to external knowledge from new firms and/or 
research organizations (cf., Coccia, 2016b; Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003). Kapoor 
& Klueter (2015) argue that incumbents tend to not invest in disruptive 
technological regimes and maintain a competence-enhancing approach. In some 
industries, such as biopharmaceutical sector, current wave of research alliances and 
acquisitions may help incumbents to overcome this ‚inertia‛ both in the initial 
stage of research and in the later stage of development. Other studies show that 
R&D investments of innovative enterprises in pharmaceutical industry are directed 
towards both internal research units and strategic alliances to accelerate the drug 
discovery process (Coccia, 2014).  
However, theoretical framework of disruptive technologies suffers of some 
limitations, such as the ambiguity in the definition of disruptive innovations that 
considers technologies but also products and business models (cf., Christensen & 
 
1 For studies on science, new technology and  economic growth see also Cavallo et al., 2014, 2014a, 
2015; Coccia 2006, 2009, 2012, 2012a, 2012b, 2015a; Coccia & Finardi, 2012, 2013; Coccia & 
Rolfo, 2000; Coccia & Wang, 2015, 2016.    
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Raynor, 2003; Tellis, 2006). Strictly speaking, a disruptive technological 
innovation is fundamentally a different phenomenon from a disruptive business-
model innovation. Disruptive innovations arise in different ways, have different 
competitive effects, and require different responses into the organizational 
behaviour of incumbents and entrants (Markides, 2006, p. 19). This diversity can 
be due to a variation in the sources of innovation, such as in some industries, users 
develop innovation, in other sectors, innovations are due to suppliers of related 
components and product manufactures (von Hippel, 1988). A vital factor in the 
development of innovations is also played by the coevolution of technical and 
institutional events (Van de Ven & Garud, 1994). The theory of disruptive 
technologies also seems to show some inconsistencies in many markets because 
new small entrants can generate new technology and innovations but their 
development and diffusion in markets present many economic barriers, such as 
within biopharmaceutical industry (Coccia, 2014; 2016). In short, the theory of 
disruptive technologies presents some difficulties to explain the general drivers of 
technological and economic change.  
This study here suggests the vital role of specific firms, called disruptive firms 
that in the ecosystems can generate and spread new technologies with market shifts 
within and between industries. The study proposes some characteristics of these 
disruptive firms that can clarify, as far as possible, a main source of innovation to 
explain drivers of technological change and, as a consequence, industrial, 
economic and social change. 
The model of this study is in Figure 1. Unlike theoretical framework of 
disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997), the theoretical framework here suggests 
that, leading firms -called disruptive firms-support the emergence and diffusion of 
new technology and radical innovations that generate market shifts, technological 
and economic change. 
 
 
Figure 1. Disruptive firms sustain technological and economic change with the introduction 
and diffusion of technical breakthroughs. 
 
The purpose of the present study is to see whether case study research supports 
the hypothesis that one of the general sources of technological change is due to 
disruptive firms (subjects) that generate market shifts, rather than disruptive 
technologies (objects) per se.    
 
3. Methods: case study research  
The methodology is based on an inductive analysis of case study research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  
The study analyzes the managerial and organizational behavior of specific 
leading enterprises (disruptive firms) to explain one of the general sources of 
technological and economic change. The firms under study are: 
* Apple Inc. for Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) 
* AstraZeneca for biopharmaceutical industry 
In particular, the hypothesis of this study is that specific and distinct firms, 
called disruptive firms, are the driving force of market shift in industries by 
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introducing new products, standard and/or components in markets with new 
technology and innovation, generating technological and socioeconomic change. 
Of course, the emergence of a disruptive technology is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the development and diffusion of new technology in 
markets that generate industrial change. Manifold factors also create important 
conditions for supporting technical breakthroughs. This study here focuses on 
specific subjects, the disruptive firms that play a vital role in competitive markets. 
In order to support the theoretical framework, firstly, the study analyzes shortly 
these firms and then we contextualized the theory with some examples of new 
technology and the organizational and managerial behavior of disruptive firms that 
generate market shift, technological and economic change.  
 
4. Inductive analysis  
Apple Inc. is an American multinational technology company headquartered in 
California (USA) that designs, develops, and sells consumer electronics, computer 
software, and online services.  Apple was founded in 1976 to develop and sell 
personal computers. It was incorporated as Apple Computer Inc. in 1977, and was 
renamed as Apple Inc. in 2007 to reflect its shifted focus toward consumer 
electronics (Wozniak, 2007). Number of employees as of October 2016 is about 
116,000 units. 
Apple Inc. is a disruptive firm of storage devices. A simple storage device was 
the floppy disk: a disk storage medium composed of a disk of thin and 
flexible magnetic storage medium encased in a rectangular plastic carrier.  In 1983 
Sony introduced 90 mm micro diskettes (better known as 3.5-inch -89 mm- floppy 
disks), which it had developed at a time when there were 4" floppy disks, and a lot 
of variations from different companies, to replace on-going 5.25" floppy disks. 
Apple Computer, a market leader in ICTs, decided to use in 1984 the 3½-inch 
drives produced by Sony in the Macintosh 128K model. This firm strategy 
effectively makes the 3½-inch drive a de-facto standard in markets. This Apples’ 
decision generated a main market shift and the format 3.5" floppy disks became 
dominant. Floppy disks 3.5" remained a popular medium for nearly 40 years, but 
their use was declining by the mid-1990s (Mee & Daniel, 1996). In 1998, Apple 
Inc. released the iMac G3 with a new store device, called USB because it 
considered the floppy disk an old technology. USB—or Universal Serial Bus—is a 
protocol for connecting peripherals to a computer. The development of the first 
USB technology began in 1994 by Intel and the USB-IF (USB Implementers 
Forum, Inc., formed with industry leaders like Intel, Microsoft, Compaq, LSI, 
Apple and Hewlett-Packard). USB was designed to standardize the connection 
of computer peripherals (Cunningham, 2014). The USB 1.0 debuted in late 1995 
and transferred data at a rate of 12 megabits per second. This parasitic technology 
is associated to other host technologies, such as PCs. Interaction between these 
high-tech devices and a host computer without the need to disconnect or restart the 
computer also enables USB technology to render more efficient operation. As just 
mentioned, in 1998, the iMac G3 was the first consumer computer to discontinue 
legacy ports (serial and parallel) in favor of USB. This implementation helped to 
pave the way for a market of solely USB peripherals rather than those using other 
ports for devices. The combination of the ease of use, self-powering capabilities 
and technical specifications offered by USB technology and related devices helped 
this new technology to triumph over other port options (Au Yong, 2006; Tham, 
2011). This decision of Apple generated a market shift and industrial change. In the 
presence of this technological change generated by a market leader, the ICT 
industry’s reaction is to follow Apple’s technological pathway, such as Dell, 
Hewlett-Packard, etc. that dumped the floppy drivers from their standard PCs. Trek 
Technology and IBM began selling the first USB flash drives commercially in 
2000. IBM's USB flash drive had a storage capacity of 8 MB, more than five times 
the capacity of the then-common 3½-inch floppy disks (of 1440 KB). Similar 
pathway is with the Compact Disc (CD), a digital optical disc data storage format 
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released in 1982 and co-developed by Philips and Sony (BBC News, 2007). The 
format was originally developed to store and play only sound recordings but was 
later adapted for storage of data (CD-ROM). Apple Inc. released the third 
generation of MacBook Pro in 2012 with a 15-inch screen that was a quarter 
thinner than its predecessor and the Retina Display with a much higher screen 
resolution. The MacBook Pro with Retina Display does not have an optical drive 
and to play discs, it is necessary to have an external Super Drive. This decision of a 
market leader generated a further market shift and industrial change towards new 
storage devices with the USB port, micro-USB or USBType-C (Hruska, 2015; Mee 
& Daniel, 1996; Goda & Kitsuregawa, 2012, USB, 2005).  
Apple Inc. is also a disruptive firm of wired headphones. Headphones are pair 
of small listening devices that are electroacoustic transducers, which convert 
an electrical signal to a corresponding sound in the user's ear. They are designed to 
allow a single user to listen to an audio source privately. Firstly, the headphone 
with jack was created in the period 1890-1910 and with several generations is still 
used in many electronic devices. The study here focuses on a critical period 
associated to Bluetooth technology (a wireless technology standard for exchanging 
data over short distances from fixed and mobile devices, and building personal area 
networks-PANs). In fact, the revolution of ICT has generated several innovations 
such as the Bluetooth technology in 1999 (Bluetooth, 2017). The evolution of this 
technology has generated in 2004 the Bluetooth 2.0 with an Enhanced Data Rate 
for faster data transfer, in 2010 Bluetooth 4.0 with low energy and so on 
(Bluetooth, 2017). The interaction between Bluetooth and mobile phone has 
generated in 2002 the first mobile phone with integrated Bluetooth by Nokia, 
whereas the interaction between Bluetooth and headphones has also generated in 
2003 the first Nokia headset, which was sold to end-users (Windows, 2012). The 
29 June, 2007 Apple Inc. launched the 1st generation of iPhone with Bluetooth 2.0; 
the diffusion of the iPhone worldwide plays a main role in the evolution of several 
ICTs, driven by Apple Inc., which is one of the market leaders in smartphones and 
other mobile devices. In 2011, Apple Inc. has announced that new iPhone 4S 
supports Bluetooth 4.0 with low energy phone.  In September 2016, the iPhone 7 of 
Generation 10th is launched without headphone jack 3.5mm. This strategic 
decision by Apple Inc. has a main impact for the evolution of new generations of 
headphones that will be more and more wireless to function, interact and survive 
with mobile devices (Coccia, 2017a). This decision of Apple Inc. to produce a new 
iPhone 7 without jack 3.5mm for headphone generates a selection pressure on 
manufacturers of these technologies that are focusing on new technological 
directions of headphones with Bluetooth― technology (wireless) generating an on-
going technological substitution and ‚Destructive creation‛ (Calvano, 2007) of 
current headphones with wire. In short, this case study seems to confirm that new 
technologies and technological trajectories are driven by specific firms that play a 
role of destruction of current technologies in favor of the creation of new 
technology and technological standards. Other examples of the organizational 
behavior of Apple Inc. as disruptive firm, are the destruction of the physical 
keyboard in smartphones with the creation of virtual keyboards in the iPhone of 1st 
generation in 2007. In general, disruptive firms have the market power to support 
new technological trajectories and industrial change. In short, the innovative 
behavior of market leaders can be a main driving force of technological, industrial 
and economic change. Moreover, market shifts are due to leader firms of host 
technologies, such as PC or smartphones, rather than leader firms of parasitic 
technologies, such as headphones, storage devices, etc. (cf., Coccia, 2017a).  
AstraZeneca (AZ) is a British–Swedish research-based biopharmaceutical 
company. It is originated by a merger in 1999 of the Astra AB company formed in 
1913 (Sweden) and British Zeneca Group formed in 1993. AstraZeneca (AZ) is a 
large corporation that has a net income of US$3.406 billion (AstraZeneca, 2016), 
total assets for US$60.12 billion (Forbes, 2016) and total number of employees for 
about 50,000 (AstraZeneca, 2015). The human and economic resources invested in 
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R&D by AstraZeneca are about 15,000 units of personnel and over US$4 billion in 
eight countries (AstraZeneca, 2015). One of the research fields of AZ is anticancer 
treatments, such as for lung cancer. The current therapeutic treatments (technology) 
for advanced non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) are again mainly based on 
chemotherapy agents. However, this technology has low efficacy for lung cancer 
treatment since the mortality rate is still high (Coccia, 2014). AstraZeneca as 
incumbent firm in drug discovery industry has generated a main radical innovation 
to treat lung cancer: the target therapy Iressa® that is based on the blocking agent 
Gefitinib. These path-breaking anticancer drugs are generating a revolution in 
therapeutic treatments of lung cancer with mutation Epidermal Growth Factor 
Receptor (EGFR) because they block specific enzymes and growth factor receptors 
involved in cancer cell proliferation (Coccia, 2012, 2014, 2016). Studies in the 
biology show that lung cancer can become resistant to these new drugs because of 
a secondary mutation (T790M) that generates a progression of the cancer with 
several metastases and, as a consequence, high mortality within five years (Coccia, 
2012). Clovis Oncology is a small pharmaceutical company, which is generating 
innovative products for new treatments in oncology. Clovis was founded in 2009 
and is headquartered in Boulder, Colorado.  This small pharmaceutical firm, Clovis 
oncology, has generated a new technology to treat lung cancer with mutation 
T790M: a new target therapy for EGFR-mutant lung cancer (Clovis Oncology, 
2015). However, this small firm has difficulties in the development of this radical 
innovation in a sector with high capital intensity for R&D. This problem has 
induced Clovis oncology to enter in the stock exchange to gather financial 
resources directed to support R&D of several innovative products in its pipeline. 
The structure of the sector based on larger corporation has induced the 
biopharmaceutical company AstraZeneca (2015) to introduce a similar innovation 
for mutant lung cancers, called Tagrisso― (AZD9291), that it was approved by US 
Food and Drug Administration in 2015 (AstraZeneca, 2016). This case study also 
confirms the vital role of large and leader firms, in competitive markets based on 
high intensity of R&D, that have the power to generate and/or to spread path-
breaking innovations in order to achieve and sustain competitive advantage, as well 
as the goal of a (temporary) profit monopoly to support their market shares and 
industrial leadership. 
Next section endeavors to detect the general characteristics of these disruptive 
firms that generate technological, industrial and economic change. 
 
5. Discussion 
A main goal of this study is the concept of disruptive firms: they are firms with 
market leadership that deliberate introduce new and improved generations of 
durable goods that destroy, directly or indirectly, similar products present in 
markets in order to support their competitive advantage and/or market leadership 
(cf., Calvano, 2017). These disruptive firms support technological and industrial 
change and induce consumers to repeat their purchase in order to adapt to new 
socioeconomic environment. Firm strategy of these leading firms is directed to 
support innovation and market leadership with new technology. An example of 
disruptive firms is Apple Inc. that has the following organizational behaviour (cf., 
Backer, 2013; Barney, 1986; Fogliasso & Williams, 2014; Heracleous, 2013; 
O’Reilly et al., 1991; Schein, 2010).  
1- A main and central leader in the organization, represented in the past by the 
founder Steve Jobs and subsequently by the CEO Tim Cook (Apple Inc., 2017). 
The hierarchy in Apple’s organizational structure supports strong control over the 
organization that empowers top leader to control everything in the organization. 
This organizational behavior generates limited flexibility of lower levels of the 
hierarchy to respond to custom needs and market demand but it provides a clear 
leadership for R&D and strategic management of innovative products.  
2- A large market share in mobile technology and associated industrial 
leadership. Samsung is the largest vendor in smartphones but it only captured 14% 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 4(4), M. Coccia,  p.437-450. 
443 
of smartphone profits, while Apple Inc. gathered 91% of them in 2015. Apple 
holds nearly 45% of the U.S. OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) market, 
and in a distant second is Samsung Electronics with 28% of the market. Notably, 
Apple is one of the only companies to actually advance its market share (from 
October through January), from 42.3% to 44.6%, for a 2.3% gain. Samsung’s 
market share declined 2% from 30% in late 2016. Apple's iPhone accounted for 
34% of all smartphone activations in the U.S. last quarter, leading all other 
smartphone brands. Samsung was just behind the iPhone at 33%, followed by LG 
at 14% share of activations (Kilhefner, 2017).  
3- Founded in 1976, more than 40 years ago. The firm has a long presence and 
experience in the sector of computer hardware, software and electronics.  
4- Headquarters is localized in a high-tech region, California, of a powerful 
country with socioeconomic influence on wide geoeconomic areas. 
5- Apple’s organizational culture is also highly innovative to support firm’s 
product development processes and firm’s industry leadership. Creativity and 
excellence are especially important in Apple’s rapid innovation processes. 
Moreover, secrecy is part of the company’s strategy to minimize theft of 
proprietary information or intellectual property. Apple employees agree to this 
organizational culture of secrecy, which is reflected in the firm’s policies, rules and 
employment contracts. This aspect of Apple’s organizational culture helps protect 
the business from corporate espionage and the negative effects of employee 
poaching. These characteristics of the company’s organizational culture are key 
factors that enable success and competitive advantage (cf. also, Csaszar, 2013; 
Damanpour & Aravind, 2012, Lehman & Haslam, 2013).  
Some characteristics of the organizational behavior of AstraZeneca (AZ) are 
(Coccia, 2014a, 2015, 2016a):  
1- A characteristic similar to previous firm is a long experience in the market 
and leadership position in specific segments of the biopharmaceutical sector. In 
fact, Astra AB formed in 1913 (Sweden) and British Zeneca Group formed in 
1993. Moreover, AstraZeneca is a large corporation in industry.  
2- Higher specialization of technological capability in new research fields of 
genetics, genomics and proteomics to support drug discovery process.  
3- Another characteristic of AZ is a division of scientific labour (cf. ‘division of 
innovative labour’ by Arora & Gambardella 1995; Coccia, 2014a). R&D strategy 
of this incumbent firm is to create strategic alliances with emerging firms for a 
division of scientific labour directed to reinforce and accelerate discovery process. 
In fact, AZ has strategic partnerships with organizations to complement in-house 
technological and scientific capabilities. In this manner, AZ supports rational 
modes of drug discoveries by integrative capabilities developed in collaboration 
with biotechnology firms (cf., Coccia, 2016b; Henderson 1994, pp. 607ff; 
Paruchuri & Eisenman, 2012). In particular, AZ builds and reinforces the scientific 
capabilities by strategic alliances with external sources of innovation: i.e., 
partnership with academic institutions, biotechs and other pharmaceutical 
companies to share skills, knowledge and resources through all phases of R&D 
process. In addition, the acquisition of the biotechnology firm MedImmune has 
improved and enlarged the R&D function and technological capabilities 
(AstraZeneca, 2015). This R&D management of AZ organizes the R&D labs with a 
network structure based on strategic alliances for supporting the process of 
disruptive innovations (figure 2). Network R&D organization reinforces the 
integrative capabilities in scientific fields, collective and cumulative learning 
between in-house R&D and external sources of innovation. Moreover, network 
structure of R&D generates a multiplicity of scientific stimuli and the adoption of 
different and complementary R&D management approaches (cf., Coccia, 2014a, 
2016b; Henderson, 1994; Jenkins, 2010).  
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Figure 2. Network of R&D function of disruptive firms to support new technologies in 
innovative industries. 
 
Generalization of characteristics of disruptive firms that generate technological 
and industrial change 
The industrial dynamics shows that the theory of disruptive technology seems to 
be not consistent for explaining the R&D and diffusion of major innovations in 
main sectors such as ICTs and biopharmaceuticals. The inductive study here 
suggests that patterns of technological innovations in markets are dominated by 
incumbents rather than entrant firms, which have not the market power and 
structure to support path-breaking innovations across markets (Coccia, 2014a, 
2015, 2016b, Daidj, 2016; Liao, 2011). In short, this study proposes the shift of the 
locus of one of basic causes of technological change, from disruptive technologies 
to disruptive firms that support path-breaking innovations and market shifts. 
The case study research here reveals some general characteristics of disruptive 
firms that generate technological change. In particular,  
1- Large size, associated to a strong market power that supports an industrial 
leadership. 
2- Disruptive firms can or cannot generate radical and/or incremental 
innovations but they have the market power to spread and support new technology 
in markets generating industrial change.  
3- Forward-looking executives seeking to pioneer radical innovations in 
competitive markets.  
4- High R&D investments to lead the markets towards new technological 
trajectories, sustain competitive advantage, the goal of a (temporary) profit 
monopoly and industrial leadership. 
5- A long historical presence and expertise in the industry for many years (e.g., 
more than 40 years). The historical development path in industries supports the 
accumulation of technological knowledge, technical expertise and experience in the 
sector, more and more important for R&D and strategic management.  
6- Organizational and managerial behavior based on competence-destroying and 
competence-enhancing.  
7- Strong dynamic capabilities based on combinations of competences and 
resources that can be developed, deployed, and protected in order to stress 
exploiting existing internal and external firm specific competences and to address 
changing environments. 
8- R&D organization of disruptive firms is more and more based on a division 
of scientific labour. Network R&D organizations reinforce integrative capabilities, 
collective and cumulative learning between in-house R&D and external sources of 
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innovation. Moreover, strategic alliances and partnership with innovative firms, 
university labs and suppliers support learning processes, accumulation of new 
knowledge and acceleration of innovation processes.  
 
6. Concluding observations 
The theoretical framework of disruptive technologies seems that does not 
explain the dynamics of technological and economic change (cf., Christensen, 
1997). The study here endeavors to clarify, whenever possible, one of driving 
forces of technological change based on the role of leader firms, called disruptive 
firms. The central contribution of this work is an approach that integrates current 
frameworks in management and industrial organization to explain the sources of 
industrial and technological change (Cooper 1990; Dosi, 1988; O’Reilly III & 
Tushman, 2004; 2008).  
In general, firms have goals, such as achieve and sustain competitive advantage 
(Teece et al., 1997).  
One of the main organizational drivers of disruptive firms is the incentive to 
find and/or to introduce innovative solutions in new products, using new 
technology, in order to reduce costs, achieve and support the goal of a (temporary) 
profit monopoly and market (industrial) leadership. Case study research here also 
shows that R&D management of leading firms has more and more a division of 
scientific labour directed to accelerate innovation process and develop new 
technology. Disruptive firms generate significant shifts in markets with an 
ambidexterity strategy based on competence-destroying and competence-enhancing 
(cf., Danneels, 2006; Henderson, 2006; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986). Moreover, a main role in disruptive firms is also played by 
‚forward-looking executives seeking to pioneer radical or disruptive innovations 
while pursuing incremental gains‛ (O’Reilly III & Tushman, 2004, p. 76). In 
general, disruptive firms, generating path-breaking innovations, grow more rapidly 
than other ones (Tushman & Anderson, 1986, p. 439). 
On the basis of the argument presented in this paper, based on a case study 
research, we can therefore conclude that one of principal sources of technological 
and economic change is due to leading subjects, disruptive firms, which can be the 
distal sources of disruptive innovations in competitive markets, ceteris paribus. 
Disruptive firms have specific dynamic capabilities that generate learning 
processes, a vital cumulative change and path dependence in innovative industries 
(cf., Garud et al., 2010; Teece et al., 1997).  
The results of the analysis here are that:   
The conceptual framework here assigns a central role to leading firms (subjects) 
–disruptive firms- rather than disruptive technologies (objects) to sustain 
technological and economic change.  
Disruptive firms are firms with market leadership that deliberate introduce new 
and improved generations of durable goods that destroy, directly or indirectly, 
similar products present in markets in order to support their competitive advantage 
and/or market leadership. These disruptive firms support technological and 
industrial change and induce consumers to buy new products to adapt to new 
socioeconomic environment. 
The establishment and diffusion of disruptive technologies in markets are 
mainly driven by incumbent (large) firms with a strong market power. However, 
small (entrant) firms can generate radical innovations but they have to cope with 
high economic resources needed for developing new technology (cf., Caner et al., 
2016). This financial issue explains the strategic alliances and partnerships between 
some incumbent and entrant firms to develop disruptive technologies. These 
collaborations mark a new phase in business development of innovations.  
Finally, the conceptual framework here also shows that R&D management of 
disruptive firms is more and more based on a division of scientific labor directed to 
reinforcing the integrative capabilities and collective learning between internal and 
external sources of innovation in order to accelerate discovery process. 
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Overall, then, the conceptual framework here, has several components of 
generalization that could easily be extended to explain the source of technological 
and economic change. To conclude, this study suggests that one of principal 
sources of industrial change is due to disruptive firms in competitive markets. To 
put it differently, this study provides a preliminary analysis of driving forces of 
technological change based on disruptive firms rather than disruptive technologies 
per se. However, the conclusions of this study are of course tentative. Most of the 
focus here is based on a case study research, clearly important but not sufficient for 
broader understanding of the complex and manifold sources of technological 
change. Moreover, the evidentiary basis of this paper is also weak, but this study 
may form a ground work for development of more sophisticated theoretical and 
empirical analyses to explain, whenever possible general causes of the 
technological and economic change. Hence, there is need for much more detailed 
research to explain the reasons for technological change in industries because we 
know that, in competitive markets with market dynamism, other things are often 
not equal over time and space. In fact, Wright (1997, p. 1562) properly claims: ‚In 
the world of technological change, bounded rationality is the rule‛. 
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